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Abstract—Energy, water, health, transportation and emergency
services act as backbones for our society. Aiming at high degrees
of efficiency, these systems are increasingly automated, depending
on communication systems. However, this makes these Critical
Infrastructures prone to cyber attacks, resulting in data leaks, re-
duced performance or even total system failure. Beyond a survey
of existing vulnerabilities, we provide an experimental evaluation
of targeted uplink jamming against Long Term Evolution (LTE)’s
air interface. Primarily, our implementations of smart attacks
on the LTE Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH), the
Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) as well as on the
radio access procedure are outlined and tested. In exploiting the
unencrypted resource assignment process, these attacks are able
to target and jam specific UE resources, effectively denying uplink
access. Evaluation results reveal the criticality of such attacks,
severely destabilizing Critical Infrastructures, while minimizing
attacker exposure. Finally we derive possible mitigations and
recommendations for 5G stakeholders, which serve to improve
the robustness of mission critical communications and enable the
design of resilient next generation mobile networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, societies heavily depend on services provided
by so-called Critical Infrastructures (CIs), including energy,
water, health, transportation, public safety and communication
systems. To improve efficiency and management of such infra-
structures, comprehensive automation is pursued, necessitating
an integration of Information and Communication Technology
(ICT). Due to the lengthy and costly deployment of dedicated
wired networks, harnessing (public) mobile communication
technologies is widely regarded a suitable approach. Yet,
ubiquitous connectivity eases access not only for authorized
users, but also for malicious third parties. Cyber attacks on CI
communication networks can severely degrade functionality
and system stability. An attack, e.g. aimed at the power grid’s
ICT infrastructure, could trigger events leading to outages or
blackouts [1]. Two major ways of disrupting a CI’s wireless
communication can be distinguished. On one side, so-called
barrage jammers may be employed, which essentially obscure
all user signals in a certain frequency range by using wideband
noise. Such jammers are very effective in disrupting services
and straightforward to implement. Yet, they can be detected
and located with low effort, allowing authorities to stop the
attack and hold attackers accountable. On the other side,
smart jammers exploit inherent system properties such as
protocol flaws, requiring less power. Thus, highly precise,
covert attacks are enabled, only affecting target devices instead
of an entire area or frequency band. Subsequently, attacks
cannot be recognized as easily. However, this class of jammers
requires more advanced technological skills and knowledge.
Hence, smart jammers are of major interest for groups with
sufficient resources and technical capacities, which want to
perform attacks, while staying hidden. Examples include hos-
tile intelligence services or well-funded terrorist groups. Em-
ployed efficiently, smart jammers provide the means to secretly
undermine critical, public infrastructures which depend on
wireless communications.
It has to be emphasized that this publication is not intended
as guideline for such groups, but rather serves to indicate
vulnerabilities and derive mitigation strategies. Therefore, the
main contributions of this paper can be summarized as below:
• General overview of possible attack vectors against cur-
rent cellular mobile communication networks,
• Design of a smart jammer for issuing attacks on the
Long Term Evolution (LTE) Physical Uplink Control
Channel (PUCCH) and Physical Uplink Shared Channel
(PUSCH), including corresponding evaluation results,
• Recommendations for improving CI communication sys-
tems, focusing on 5G developments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
provides a survey of key jammer properties and known attacks.
It is followed by an overview of related work (Sec. III). Next,
we introduce our smart uplink jammer (Sec. IV) and present
evaluation results (Sec. V). Recommendations for increased re-
siliency are given in Section VI. Finally, Section VII provides
a summary and an outlook on future work.
II. JAMMER PROPERTIES, POSSIBLE ATTACKS
AND MITIGATIONS
This section provides an overview of key jammer properties
and possible attack vectors in LTE infrastructures.
A. Jammer Properties
To disrupt radio communications, barrage jammers allow
configuration of the used power level, bandwidth and duty
cycle. Higher power levels increase the affected area and
boost the impact on user signals, yet make the attacker more
vulnerable to detection. Duty cycles indicate periods, in which
the jammer is active. In contrast to barrage jammers, which
are limited to the above mentioned properties, smart jammers
provide the following additional parameters:
Synchronization: Synchronizing jamming to target signals
maximizes an attack’s impact, while minimizing visibility.
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Figure 1: Overview of selected attack vectors, targeting the LTE down- and uplink
Eavesdropping: For the same reasons, gathering inform-
ation about a target system before initiating an attack is
beneficial. In LTE, this task is facilitated by the lack of
Media Access Control (MAC) and Radio Link Control (RLC)
encryption. Thus, subscribers may be de-anonymized [2] or
User Equipment (UE) locations can be tracked [3]. In case of
stationary UEs, e.g. in Smart Grids, a high level of channel
awareness could be obtained and utilized by the attacker.
Placement: Due to their small form factor, smart jammers
allow for arbitrary placement. Preferable locations may be
close to the UE for downlink or near the evolved Node B
(eNB) for uplink jamming. Thus, lower power levels can
be employed, minimizing attack visibility. In contrast, high
powered barrage jammers may be of significant size.
Directionality: Smart jammers may utilize highly direc-
tional antennas, focusing on specific targets. This increases
range while decreasing power consumption, visibility and size.
B. Attack Vectors
LTE Radio Access Networks (RANs) can be attacked at the
physical layer, physical channel and protocol level. Examples
of each category are given below, summarized by Figure 1.
1) Physical Layer Attacks:
Cyclic Prefix Attack: As a key component of the Ortho-
gonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) signal, the
cyclic prefix prevents inter symbol interference and enables
frequency domain equalization. To degrade radio performance,
noise can be emitted during cyclic prefix transmission. Such an
attack is considered highly effective as no specific mitigation is
known, but it requires near perfect knowledge of the channel.
Synchronization Attack: In the course of a synchroniza-
tion attack, the UE is prevented from receiving the Primary
Synchronization Signal (PSS)/Demodulation Reference Signal
(DMRS) (down-/uplink) by shifting the symbol timing peak.
Here, the main challenge is locking onto the target signal.
Reference Signal Attack: Reference signal (pilot) attacks
(Cell Specific Reference Signal (CRS)/DMRS) cause faulty
channel estimations. Thereby, diverging conditions are as-
sumed, limiting physical channel throughput. As downlink
pilot signals are sparse, an attack requires a minimal duty cycle
and transmission power. However, precise synchronization
based on an analysis of channel conditions is required.
2) Physical Channel Attacks:
Physical Control Format Indicator Channel (PCFICH)
Jamming: This method corrupts the channel format indicator.
First, the jammer synchronizes to the cell, to receive and
decode the Master Information Block (MIB). Next PCFICH
elements are calculated and noise or a modulated signal is
transmitted on top of them. If the corrupted Control Format
Indicator (CFI) is higher than the actual one, the UE tries to
decode non-existent Downlink Control Informations (DCIs).
In case the corrupted CFI is lower, the UE overlooks DCIs.
For both scenarios, the first subframe slot’s Physical Downlink
Shared Channel (PDSCH) symbols are expected in the wrong
location, causing errors in the corresponding transport blocks.
PDSCH Jamming: The PDSCH carries configuration as
well as downlink user data. Hence, it allows targeting one or
multiple UEs. Precise synchronization and DCI decoding are
required to locate resources of a particular UE.
Paging Jamming: Here PDSCH jamming is modified, by
targeting paging channel Resource Blocks (RBs). The channel
informs idle UEs of pending downlink data. If respective RBs
are jammed, the UE is never notified of transmissions and
remains idle. This attack reduces a jammer’s duty cycle to pre-
dictable paging periods, relaxing DCI decoding requirements.
PUSCH Jamming: The purest version of PUSCH jamming
is achieved by using a barrage of white noise on this channel.
It is straightforward to implement, enabling Denial of Service
(DoS) throughout an entire cell.
PUCCH Jamming: The PUCCH is located at the edge of
the uplink bandwidth. Thus, it can be identified and jammed
with low effort, affecting many UEs at once. The attack can
lead to misinterpretation of received signals as scheduling
requests, Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (HARQ) (negat-
ive) acknowledgments, Channel Quality Indicators (CQIs) or
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) precoding matrices,
drastically reducing up- and downlink throughput. While some
control data may be multiplexed into the PUSCH, use of the
PUCCH enables higher cell capacities and data rates (e.g.
via MIMO). Another advantage for the adversary is that the
PUCCH power limit is commonly lower than the PUSCH
power limit in order to reduce inter-cell interference.
UE Targeted Uplink Jamming: Since the entire uplink
(both PUSCH and PUCCH) is slaved to the downlink with
4ms delay, attackers can identify and target a particular UE’s
RBs. This is due to the nature of the PDSCH, which relies on
obfuscation via Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) mask rather
than proper encryption. An implementation and evaluation of
such a jammer is detailed in Section IV. Given a DCI decoder,
a target device’s RBs can be found via its Radio Network
Temporary Identifier (RNTI), obtainable by combining de-
anonymization [3] with tools like C3ACE [4].
3) Protocol Attacks:
Cell Barring Spoofing: Rogue eNBs mimic real cells, barring
UEs from connecting to specific cells by transmitting cell-
Barred and intraFreqReselection flags. Thus, UEs will ignore
any cells on that frequency. Also, LTE requires UEs to ban
cells from which System Information Blocks (SIBs) or MIBs
are not received within a defined time frame. Hence, corrupting
these blocks leads to barred cells for up to 300 s as well [5].
Reject Spoofing: An identical rogue cell is created by
synchronizing to a legitimate cell and mimicking its relevant
parameters such as Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) ID,
tracking area, etc. Next, target UEs are forced from their ori-
ginal cell, and the rogue cell rejects subsequent reattachment
attempts. Depending on the specific implementation, UEs may
treat the PLMN as generally barred. Thus, this attack can be
very efficient, yet requires significant effort.
III. RELATED WORK
In recent years, several publications have dealt with the
analysis of different LTE vulnerabilities. An overview of
various attack vectors against the LTE air interface is given
in [6], estimating potential jammer to signal power ratios.
Hussain et al. propose LTEInspector [7], which combines a
symbolic model checker with a cryptographic protocol verifier.
It is applied to analyze several different attacks, most of which
are validated using a testbed set-up. Though commercial UEs
are used for verification, evaluation is mainly focused on
protocol implementations and core network signaling. Cyclic
prefix and pilot jamming are evaluated for both up- and down-
link in [8]. Measurements indicate that Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) is more resilient against
these types of attack than Single-Carrier Frequency Division
Multiple Access (SC-FDMA). A method for disrupting the
PCFICH is introduced in [9], using simulations for validation.
However, real-world measurements would be required for a
comprehensive assessment. Also, 5G will mitigate the threat
by removing the PCFICH. Labib et al. use radio frequency
spoofing to impair synchronization and cell selection [10,
11]. Based on experiments with a software UE, enhancements
to the aforementioned techniques are proposed. Simulations
are performed in [12] to evaluate jamming against different
PUCCH formats. Possible mitigations are discussed, e.g. fore-
going PUCCH transmissions at the cost of limiting system
capacity. DoS and de-anonymization (International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catching) attacks are evaluated
against commercial UEs in a laboratory by [13]. Yet, the
employed eNB is not commercial grade. Rao et al. provide
physical layer measurements on LTE resilience, considering
attacks on different features of the OFDMA downlink signal
[14]. However, the same open-source eNB and UE implement-
ations are evaluated against each other. Thus, results cannot
be generalized to commercial equipment.
In comparison to related work, this publication evaluates
further aspects of the LTE air interface, considering the impact
on end-to-end connectivity of commercial grade equipment.
IV. TARGETED UPLINK JAMMERING:
CONCEPT, IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION SCENARIO
Within this section, we introduce our approaches to jam-
ming and describe the scenario and measurement setup.
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A. Smart Uplink Jamming Concepts
1) PUSCH/PUCCH Jammer: Our jammer, implemented on
top of srsLTE [15], disturbs the LTE PUSCH and PUCCH
respectively. To perform the attack, we synchronize the device
with a cell, decode the Physical Downlink Control Channel
(PDCCH) and transmit on RBs, originally assigned to the
target UE. Building on the UE implementation in srsLTE,
the jammer imitates the victim device. Upon activation, the
jammer jumps to the Radio Resource Control (RRC) Con-
nected State immediately, utilizing the provided target RNTI.
Afterwards, the jammer is able to transmit on top of the UE’s
assigned RBs. No other radio access or scheduling requests
are issued and RRC remains nearly unchanged.
2) Physical Radio Access Termination in LTE (PRATTLE):
Besides the above described jammers, an attack on the radio
access procedure is devised, referred to as PRATTLE. It targets
the first PUSCH message of one or several UEs. The attack is
structured as shown in Figure 2: 1) The jammer continuously
monitors the PDCCH for Radio Access Response Grants. 2)
RRC Connection Requests, identified by grants, are jammed
repeatedly. 3) Due to this attack, the UE fails the complete
procedure and retries until a maximum number of attempts (6
to 200) is reached. After that, the corresponding cell is to be
treated as barred for up to 300 s [5]. In the following, however,
only the former two attacks are evaluated.
3) Critical Infrastructure Jamming Scenario: To evaluate
the developed uplink jammer’s effectiveness, we consider a
Smart Grid scenario. Such CIs possess well-defined require-
ments, as specified by e.g. the International Electrotechnical
Committee (IEC)’s standard 61850 [16], which are extremely
challenging regarding reliability and latency. Moreover, cyber
attacks on power grid ICT infrastructures may be of severe
consequences, endangering all dependent systems. Attackers
profit from the static nature of grid assets, allowing for optimal
target localization and jammer placement. We specifically
consider IEC 61850 based Wide Area Monitoring Protection
and Control (WAMPAC) systems, regularly transmitting meas-
urement data between Smart Grid substations.
B. Experimental Measurement Setup
Measurements are performed within our laboratory as
shown in Figure 3, in isolation from public radio networks.
For this purpose, the UE under test is placed in a shielding
box and connected to the eNB via a box-internal antenna. UE
uplink and jammer signal are combined and fed to the eNB.
For synchronization, the downlink signal of a commercial,
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Figure 3: Experimental setup for evaluating the uplink jammer
Software-Defined Radio (SDR)-based Amarisoft base station
is sent to UE and jammer. An Ettus Research N210 Single
Input Single Output (SISO) / 2x2 MIMO SDR serves as
radio frequency frontend. The eNB supports dynamic power
control, status displays, an Application Programming Interface
(API) for retrieving diagnostic data, information on active
RNTIs and UE identities. It is configured with a bandwidth of
20MHz and parametrized to emulate an observed real world
cell. Transmit and receive gain of the eNB are adjusted to
achieve stable, near optimal radio link conditions. Mobility
Management Entity (MME), Serving Gateway (S-GW) and
Packet Gateway (P-GW) functionalities are provided by an
NG40 Virtual Evolved Packet Core (EPC). The jammer itself
utilizes the Ettus Research B210 SDR platform, which is
recommended for use with srsLTE. As victim UEs, we employ
a Sierra Wireless Air Prime EM7455 (Qualcomm Snapdragon
X7 LTE Modem, Cat. 6) and a Huawei ME909s-120 (HiSil-
icon Balong 711, Cat. 4), as both devices enable an automated
evaluation process. Additional qualitative evaluations with an
LG G5 smartphone (Qualcomm X12 LTE) confirm the results.
Measurements are conducted for PUSCH and PUCCH at
different jammer gain levels, with two LTE implementations
(i.e. UEs). The transmission of measurement values according
to IEC 61850, is replicated with our purpose-built traffic
generator, offering a higher degree of flexibility than standard
tools. Initial experiments show that the eNB limits the UE’s
capability of mitigating jamming-induced, degraded Signal-
to-Noise Ratio (SNR), as the eNB aims to reduce the UE’s
transmission power for minimizing interference between users.
Further, our evaluations indicate high sensitivity towards vari-
ations of LTE set-up parameters.
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
For evaluation, measurement values are transmitted every
1ms via 800Byte User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets.
Jammer gain is increased from 1 to 35 dB with a step size of
2 dB. At every gain level 20 runs of 60 s duration each are
performed. The jammer is active for 39 s between tstart =
6 s and tend = 45 s. We employ the following measurement
procedure: 1) start of eNB, UE and traffic generation/reception
servers, 2) initiation of the UE’s packet stream, 3) jammer
start, 4) jammer stop, 5) recovery period of the UE-eNB link,
6) waiting for the traffic generator’s termination packet (if the
link is re-established) and the receiver’s report.
1) PUCCH vs. PUSCH jamming: Figure 4 gives exemplary
results of both tested UEs at three different jammer gain levels.
Repeated runs show similar behavior. For low gains (about
2 dB), it can be noted that PUCCH jamming does not affect
the connection. Applying high gains, retransmissions occur
without loss of packets. However, for 10 dB jamming retrans-
missions occur, reducing throughput. Packets are dropped as
the UE is unable to drain its transmit buffer. Boosting gain
further reduces throughput to zero. PUCCH-only jamming has
a low impact as the eNB shifts control data to the PUSCH.
2) PUSCH jamming for different UE implementations: The
behavior of different UEs under PUSCH jamming is compared
in Figure 5. It illustrates the total number of successfully
received packets for different jammer gains. Both UEs start
to lose packets from gains of approximately 11 dB. Yet, at
higher gain levels the two devices recover slightly, with the
Huawei increasing throughput between 19−23 dB and the
Sierra Wireless in the range of 21−25 dB. This is caused
by the eNB detecting the worsening channel conditions. It
therefore grants additional resources and requests the UE to
use more robust modulation and coding schemes. Furthermore,
the Huawei UE recovers at a gain of 35 dB, which is explained
in more detail in the following paragraph. Overall the Huawei
modem shows better resilience, achieving higher throughput
for most configurations. However, in contrast to the Sierra
Wireless UE, it frequently crashes, requiring manual restarts.
The following analysis provides additional details on the
Huawei UE’s reaction to PUSCH jamming. Figure 6 shows
its uplink throughput over time for selected gains. Again,
runs with the same parameter set exhibit similar behavior.
The top part of Figure 6 (gain: 19 dB) shows strongly fluc-
tuating throughput starting at 6 s, due to jamming induced
link degradation. At 18 s (28 s respectively) the UE loses
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eNB connectivity and attempts to reconnect using its previous
RNTI. Thus, the jammer is able to continue its attack as soon
as the UE reconnects. After failing the radio access procedure
several times, the UE enters a back off period of (in this case)
8 s. With higher gains (middle of Figure 6), the UE is forced
from the cell immediately after radio access ( 1 s), as its
signal is significantly weaker than the jammer’s. The bottom
part of Figure 6 is specific to the Huawei device. At a very high
jammer gain of 33 dB the connection is disrupted in a way,
which causes the UE to assume a complete connection loss.
Hence, it starts an entirely new connection, utilizing a different
RNTI and sending an RRC Connection Request instead of an
RRC Reestablish Request. In this way the UE shakes off the
jammer, achieving stable transmission after 14 s.
Repeating experiments with the Sierra Wireless UE show
behavior similar to the Huawei modem. However, the Sierra
Wireless handset does not recover in any case. Also, the UE’s
back off period increases with the number of failures (up
to: Sierra 22 s, Huawei 12 s), i.e. at higher jammer gains. In
several cases it even refuses to connect for up to 300 s. This
indicates that the cell barring timer is used to exclude the eNB
from its list of selectable cells.
A. Uplink Jamming Mitigations
An uplink jamming attack may be identified by the eNB on
basis of up- and downlink channel conditions diverging signi-
ficantly from each other as well as from historical data. Our
evaluations using the Huawei device already point to a possible
mitigation strategy. It was shown that switching the RNTI
allows to render the attack ineffective, requiring the attacker to
re-identify the UE. Hence, new, unpredictable RNTIs should
be assigned on both connection and reconnection attempts.
Yet, since control channels in LTE are not encrypted, this is
not a sustainable option. Beyond that, eNBs should assign
more robust modulation and coding schemes more quickly and
allow critical UEs a higher transmit power.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
5G STANDARDIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT
In the following we provide recommendations for 5G stake-
holders organized by standardization and deployment aspects.
A. Standardization of 5G Mobile Networks
As a major aspect of 5th Generation of Cellular Mobile
Communication (5G) new radio, beamforming increases re-
silience against jamming. However, there are still several
shortcomings, which should be addressed by future 5G re-
leases. Though 5G finally supports encryption and integrity
protection of Signalling Resource Bearer (SRB)> 0 and
Dedicated Resource Bearer (DRB) [17, 18], null encryption
is still acceptable [18]. Even if encryption is applied, the
air interface is not secured until after the UE successfully
completes the entire attach procedure [18].
1) Mitigating Cell Barring and Reject Spoofing Attacks:
According to the 5G RRC standard [17] intra-frequency
barring is still applied without verifying broadcasted bar-
ring information. Such cell impersonation attacks could be
prevented through the use of verification schemes for cell
configuration (either for all UEs or those required by CI).
Therefore, the following mechanism may be employed, using
signatures applicable to both LTE and 5G: 1) Operators gener-
ate public/private key pairs of reasonable size (e.g. 2048 bit).
2) Operators provision public keys in the Subscriber Identity
Modules (SIMs). 3) Operators sign hashes of concatenated
MIB and scheduled SIB contents with their private keys 4)
Base stations broadcast the signature in dedicated SIBs. 5) UEs
receive all periodic SIBs, tentatively applying their settings,
then verify the signature using the public key. 6) If verification
succeeds, settings are committed (including intra-frequency
cell barring), otherwise the settings are ignored and the cell
is treated as malicious. While this approach prolongs the cell
search, it precludes barring spoofing and reject attacks.
2) Mitigating Uplink Jamming Attacks: As in LTE, the 5G
PDCCH is not encrypted. Hence findings still apply (with few
limitations). A simple means of increasing the computational
load for the attacker is scrambling the entire DCI with a
sequence derived from the destination RNTI, rather than just
scrambling the CRC (as in LTE). To compensate for limited
DCI entropy, an RNTI hopping scheme can be employed at
5G base stations by periodically reconfiguring the RNTI, once
encryption for SRB1 [17] is established. Thus, the probability
of an attacker learning the RNTI during its lifetime is reduced.
Besides, some general measures can be used to improve the
resilience of 5G. Providing the standard in a machine readable
formate would facilitate (automatic) identification of critical
flaws. Lightweight, mutual authentication and encryption for
the air interface should be introduced. Open, less complex,
single-purpose protocols, such as Internet protocols, should
be preferred to highly flexible solutions with many optional,
potentially vulnerable extensions. Also, legacy compatibility
with insecure mechanisms and protocols is to be avoided.
B. 5G System Operation for Critical Infrastructures
To identify irregularities in system operation, 5G mobile
network operators should deploy advanced monitoring sys-
tems. Rogue and impersonated eNBs can be identified with
this method. Beamforming antennas allow to increase SNR,
suppress interference signals and restrict jammer placement
options, thus enhancing resilience. Distributed beamforming
techniques such as Coordinated Multi Point (CoMP) provide
more robust radio links by receiving signals from multiple
eNBs. Secure reallocation schemes for temporary IMSI mit-
igate de-anonymization. Disallowed or limited null-ciphering
protects user data and improves overall security.
Prior to deployment, CI operators ought to check coverage
to ensure UEs are offered high signal strength connections via
more than one eNB, providing mobile network redundancy.
Location specific connection properties should be considered
during UE installation, e.g. directed antennas may be em-
ployed under line-of-sight conditions. Operators should pro-
cure UEs, which support higher MIMO schemes for spatial
redundancy. Locking SIMs into tracking areas mitigates rogue
eNBs with different area codes. Also, SIM cards without voice
services prevent de-anonymization through call-repetition and
downgrade attacks, i.e. forcing UEs into insecure and slow
2G/3G cells. CI utilities and mobile network providers can
improve attack detection by continuously exchanging perform-
ance data, e.g. via secure APIs. Also, appropriate layer 4
protocols help reduce the impact of jamming.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Within this paper we provide an overview of relevant cyber
attacks on mobile communication networks, endangering the
stability of CIs. In particular, we present our concept for
disrupting uplink communications on the LTE PUSCH of a
Smart Grid ICT infrastructure. Corresponding experimental
evaluations demonstrate the attack’s effectiveness. The jammer
is shown to significantly reduce throughput, forcing the UE to
back off or even crash. Moreover, our analysis also indicates
potential mitigations such as the application of scrambled or
encrypted DCIs. Recommendations to mobile network and CI
operators as well as to standardization bodies are derived,
revealing a path towards secure and resilient 5G. Key improve-
ments involve beamforming and massive MIMO.
In future work, we aim at broadening the evaluation to further
equipment. Also, the public radio access termination attack,
described in Section II, is to be implemented and analyzed in
detail. For mitigation, we plan to develop a robust, lightweight
DCI encryption/scrambling strategy to counter eavesdropping,
which serves as basis for attacks such as those presented here.
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